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Fears that the COVID-19 pandemic will lead to massive deaths in sub-Sa-
haran Africa have not materialised. However, the region will not be spared 
from its effects in 2021 regardless. Many challenges unrelated to the pan-
demic persist and are likely to be aggravated by the coronavirus outbreak, 
putting at risk previous progress made. We present a selective list and ana-
lysis of “ten things to watch” in Africa in 2021.
 • Fighting the Pandemic: As the world watches the race over vaccines and the 
start of mass vaccination, it remains doubtful that vaccinations will be avail-
able on the African continent anytime soon. Rising infection rates give reason 
to worry, and 2021 has already seen new lockdown measures that again hit the 
already poor and vulnerable.
 • Conflicts: Jihadism will fuel further conflict while additional conflict potentials 
in Central Africa and elsewhere need to be watched closely too, especially in 
Ethiopia given it is on the verge of civil war and state disintegration.
 • Politics: COVID-19-related restrictions may increase authoritarian tendencies. 
In several countries – including Ethiopia, The Gambia, Uganda, and Zambia – 
crucial elections will be held in 2021 that pose the risk of further democratic 
backsliding. Africa’s giant Nigeria may see a continuation of the EndSARS pro-
tests.
 • Development: The current crisis entails important risks for Africa’s economic 
outlook, including the delay of regional integration, increasing government 
debt, and the drying-up of foreign investment flows. Poverty will remain on the 
rise, while the food crisis is likely to be exacerbated. 
Policy Implications
Regarding the pandemic, it will be key that Africa gets its share of vaccines. 
European Union–Africa relations deserve a reset at the upcoming Africa–EU 
summit that is likely to be mainly concerned with the economic fallout of the 
pandemic. After Donald Trump’s demise, it remains to be seen whether the new 
United States Africa policy will overcome “Africa apathy” or will instead turn the 
continent into a battleground in the expanding rivalry with China. 
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The Pandemic and Africa in the Race for the Vaccine
To the surprise of many observers, sub-Saharan Africa has been less hit by the coro-
navirus than other world regions, with the notable exception of South Africa. Many 
African governments imposed strict lockdowns in March 2020, often even before 
the first cases were detected in their countries and citizens have shown strong soli-
darity to help contain the virus. The explanations for this positive development are 
manifold and range from – in addition to the prompt lockdowns – prior experience 
with fighting the Ebola virus and cholera outbreaks, Africa’s young population, the 
warm climate, to potentially higher protection as a lot of citizens might be exposed 
to pathogens on a more regular basis than in other world regions. Others point 
to the fact that the weak public health systems produce only poor data and might 
underestimate infection rates. Yet after these initial successes, as in other world 
regions, transmission rates are steeply rising again with 1.1 million infected indi-
viduals and more than 30,000 COVID-19-related deaths (Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity 2021). The year 2021 will probably soon see new lockdown measures that again 
hit the already poor and vulnerable particularly hard. Even without new lockdowns, 
the economic slowdown means extreme poverty in Africa will be on the rise again – 
in contrast to the years before the pandemic.
Although African countries are making it, overall, better through the pandemic 
than expected, hopes for the vaccines are high. Yet, experts do not expect vacci-
nation to begin until mid-2021 due to logistical difficulties. Hence, as the world 
watches the race over doses and the start of mass vaccination in the West, it remains 
to be seen if and when vaccination will be available on the continent and to what 
extent the COVAX facility – the vaccines pillar of the Access to COVID-19 Tools 
Accelerator of the World Health Organization – will be able to cushion the strong 
global inequalities in access. Thus far, the initiative has secured two billion doses 
for low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Yet, Africa will not receive nearly 
enough vaccines from COVAX to achieve herd immunity – in other words, to vac-
cinate 60 per cent of the population. In fact, for 2021 the target for Africa currently 
stands at 20 per cent. 
The inequalities in purchasing related vaccines are likely to be exacerbated 
by difficulties in actually testing and delivering them. Thus far, neither the Pfizer- 
BioNTech nor the Moderna candidates have been tested on population samples in 
Africa. Countries in the region are therefore putting high hopes on AstraZeneca’s 
vaccine candidate. Kenya is currently running trials with this product. Experts do 
consider it an alternative for LMICs as it is logistically easier to distribute – that 
because it can be stored at room temperature, meaning its effectiveness will not rely 
on cold-storage facilities and reliable electricity sources. Furthermore, AstraZeneca 
is contractually obligated by the vaccine’s developer, Oxford University, to sell it at 
a price that just covers costs. Hence, poorer countries may not be subjected to the 
bidding war with richer nations that we have seen in the past. 
Jihadist Violent Conflict: The Other Lingering Pandemic
Violent conflicts will continue to challenge governments and societies in sub-Saha-
ran Africa in 2021, although fears of massive escalation due to the pandemic have 
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not (yet) materialised. Often concentrating on individual conflicts, observers tend 
to overlook the region-wide spread of militant jihadist conflict. Long-term trends 
show what might resemble a “political pandemic”: At the start of the new millen-
nium, there were no active jihadist insurgencies. In 2006, Al-Shabaab emerged in 
Somalia and later spilled over to neighbouring Kenya. In 2009, the Boko Haram in-
surgency started in Nigeria, spreading to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger in subsequent 
years. In 2012, the Tuareg rebellion in north Mali was joined by Islamist rebels; 
the insurgency has now spread to Burkina Faso and Niger. In 2015, Ansar al-Sunna 
started its attacks against the Mozambican government in the northern Cabo Del-
gado region. In 2020, attacks spilled over to southern Tanzania with a further risk 
of escalation. The Allied Democratic Front, originating in Uganda and operating in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2019. 
In sum, jihadist violence has “infected” almost one-quarter of all sub-Saharan 
African countries; the majority of armed conflicts there have a jihadist dimension to 
them (Pettersson and Öberg 2020). Jihadist groups are connected through a trans-
national ideology, often cooperate, most groups are affiliated with either Al-Qaida 
or ISIS, and they receive material and ideological support from the Middle East 
and North Africa region. Jihadist and other religious conflicts tend to be bloodier 
and are more difficult to resolve given the groups’ demands. Most worryingly, they 
may further spread to previously rather peaceful countries with a religiously mixed 
popu lation as found in Central, East, and West Africa (e.g. Benin, Central African 
Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Tanzania, or Togo). Jihadist conflicts often mix 
with ethnic conflict and other non-religious conflict drivers, and have already pro-
duced large-scale intercommunal violence in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Weak 
states enable operations and make extremist ideology relatively attractive as gov-
ernments do not deliver in terms of development and good governance. Counter-
insurgency has failed to defeat these groups and often escalates violence by killing 
civilians, creating additional grievances.
A decisive reaction to jihadism must address both security and development; 
in terms of security, capable state forces remain indispensable – but in the long 
run only a new “social contract” will help (Lierl 2020). External support will be 
necessary. It remains to be seen how exactly the European Union’s new Counter 
Terrorism Agenda 2020–2025, published in December 2020 and explicitly aiming 
at cooperation with African governments, will be brought to life. Yet the long-term 
answer must be African in origin, and possibly include the pro-peace potential of 
religion. We should not underestimate risks largely unrelated to jihadism either, 
especially in conflict theatres like Cameroon, CAR, the DRC, South Sudan, as well 
as Ethiopia.
Ethiopia on the Verge of Civil War and State Disintegration
In Ethiopia a power struggle between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the leader-
ship of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) escalated slowly, and culmi-
nated in a direct military confrontation between the federal army and the TPLF in 
November 2020. Since his coming to power in 2018, Abiy – who is of mixed Oromo 
and Amhara descent – has strived to weaken the TPLF’s dominant role in Ethiopia’s 
political system. In response, the Tigrayan leadership withdrew its members from 
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the federal government. Further, following the postponement of scheduled national 
elections in August 2020 – allegedly due to the pandemic – the TPLF successfully 
held its own regional ones in Tigray instead. 
In a further escalation of events, both of the political entities that are the Feder-
al Government and Tigray’s Regional Government consider each other illegal, and 
in early November a war between federal forces and the TPLF broke out. Despite 
claims by the prime minister that this was a mere law enforcement operation during 
which “not one single civilian has been killed” (Reuters 2020), the TPLF retreated 
to the mountains and launched a guerrilla struggle. So far, about 50,000 civilians 
have fled from Tigray to Sudan, with ethnic-based massacres resulting in hundreds 
of deaths (UN News 2020). Eritrean soldiers were clandestinely involved in the 
military operation (Stewart and Lewis 2020). Thousands of Eritrean refugees were 
displaced from refugee camps in Tigray, and many have been deported back to Eri-
trea against their will. 
In 2021, Ethiopia’s internal cohesion finds itself threatened by this conflict in 
Tigray and a looming humanitarian tragedy (including displacement and famine). 
Ethnic conflicts are also imminent in other parts of Ethiopia, and ethnic profiling 
against Tigrayans – even among the staff of Ethiopian Airlines – is on the rise. 
Ahmed has rejected international mediation attempts and rescinded much of his 
political reform agenda. He has increasingly resorted to repression, and state media 
outlets have been turned into propaganda tools. Meanwhile a new date for national 
elections has been set for June, but parts of the opposition, including influential 
Oromo activists, have announced a boycott due to the extensive detainment of their 
members and supporters. It is doubtful if the elections will be carried out in a free 
and democratic manner, and it is unclear how Abiy will proceed with his political 
reforms. So far, the prime minister has not provided an alternative to the system 
of ethnic federalism introduced by former TPLF leader and prime minister Meles 
Zenawi. It also remains to be seen if Abiy will be ready to return to the negotiating 
table to solve political power struggles. Otherwise, ethnic conflict may lead to fur-
ther tragedies, and in the worst-case scenario to state disintegration.
The Pandemic’s Political Fallout: Increased Authoritarian 
Tendencies 
COVID-19 still bears the risk of disrupting democratic governance in Africa. The 
pandemic could weaken authoritarian regimes in the long run, yet it seems more 
likely that it will favour authoritarian practices like it did in 2020. While current 
government responses to the pandemic on the continent have started to exhibit 
fewer violations of democratic rights (Kolvani et al. 2020), several (authoritarian) 
regimes continue to use the outbreak as a justification for repression and the con-
solidation of power. Examples of the excessive use of violence by the police to en-
force coronavirus-related emergency measures have included Uganda, Zim babwe, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Kenya, and Angola. Even within single countries, there was light 
and shadows. Ghana has been characterised as one of the few African countries 
that only experienced minor violations of democratic standards in response to 
 COVID-19, but some journalists were nonetheless attacked by soldiers enforcing 
the lockdown there (Cascais 2020). 
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This mixed record of political responses to the pandemic is likely to persist over 
the next year. Two developments deserve particular attention here. First, COVID-19 
will continue to shape electoral processes (see also, “Election Watch 2021”). In 
2021, elections will be held in several countries where pandemic-related measures 
have affected the respect for democratic standards, including Ethiopia, The Gam-
bia, Uganda, and Zambia. During the past year, elections have also been postponed 
in response to COVID-19, yet occasionally also for political ends. Even in countries 
that held elections as planned, the pandemic allowed governments to exercise tight 
control over the process. In Burundi, for example, quarantine obligations were used 
to impede external election observation. As long as the ongoing pandemic requires 
election safety regulations to contain the spread of the virus during campaigns and 
polling, this will continue to offer possibilities for political abuse. Second, public 
health regulations can affect public protest. Sub-Saharan Africa had seen a signifi-
cant increase in anti-government demonstrations during the 2010s, but COVID-19 
has since undermined this trend. In Zimbabwe, members of the opposition and civil 
society were ostensibly detained for violating lockdown regulations during the gov-
ernment’s violent crackdown on political opponents. As the continent now faces the 
pandemic’s second wave, strict public health measures could once again be abused 
to restrict political protest. 
Election Watch 2021: No Electoral Turnover in Sight 
In 2021, not very many elections are due in sub-Saharan Africa. Ethiopia with its 
parliamentary system and related elections due in June aside, the crucial elections 
are about the presidency. It is unlikely that they will bring any electoral turnovers 
of power. In seven countries – Benin, Chad, Djibouti, The Gambia, Republic of Con-
go, Uganda, and Zambia – incumbent presidents will stand for re-election. Beyond 
COVID-19-related authoritarian tendencies, in general incumbents enjoy several 
advantages like higher visibility, agenda control, and access to state resources – 
factors increasing their odds of winning office (Przeworski 2015). The incumbents 
running for president in 2021 are unlikely to buck this trend. Among them are sev-
eral long-time rulers: Chad’s Idriss Déby (in power since 1990), Djibouti’s Ismail 
Omar Guelleh (in power since 1999), Republic of Congo’s Denis Sassou Nguesso (in 
power since 1979, but interrupted in the period 1992–1997), and Uganda’s  Yoweri 
 Museveni (in power since 1986). These leaders have shown in the past how to weak-
en the opposition and manipulate elections. Only Museveni has faced a more severe 
threat to his hold on power. The 38-year-old Robert Kyagulanyi, aka Bobi Wine, a 
popular musician and actor, was able to gather substantial electoral support. Mu-
seveni has fought back harshly by arresting Wine several times, attacking the lat-
ter’s rallies, and by intimidating media outlets. At the time of writing, in January 
2021, Museveni seemed to have secured a clear victory in presidential elections. 
However, Wine’s popularity among the younger generation, the majority of the 
Ugandan popu lation, will continue to pose a threat to Museveni’s rule. 
Benin and Zambia hold greater democratic credentials than the countries dis-
cussed above, but their respective incumbents Patrice Talon and Edgar Lungu do 
not shy away either from authoritarian practices when it comes to containing op-
ponents. Benin’s two most prominent opposition figures – Sébastien Ajavon and 
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Lionel Zinsou – are currently in exile after having been convicted by Beninese courts 
in controversial rulings. Due to severe national economic problems Lungu could 
lose the election, but he proved already in 2016 his willingness to manipulate the 
electoral process when required. The most open presidential race may take place in 
The Gambia in December. In 2016, Adama Barrow unexpectedly defeated then pres-
ident Yahya Jammeh and ended the latter’s 22-year-long rule. However, Barrow’s 
candidacy was only possible because veteran opposition politician Ousainou Darboe 
was in prison at the time. Barrow stepped in and was supported by an alliance of op-
position parties. Darboe became Barrow’s vice president. Yet, in the meantime, the 
alliance between Barrow and Darboe has collapsed, and the latter plans to challenge 
the incumbent – accusing him of blocking democratic reforms and of corruption. 
EndSARS Protest: Shifting Nigeria’s Political Paradigm
The demand to end the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) – created in 1992 to 
deal with robbery, vehicle theft, kidnapping, and cattle rustling – began in 2016. It 
arose after several reports of human rights abuses by SARS, including illegal “stop-
and-search” measures, illegal arrests and detentions, extrajudicial killings, the sex-
ual harassment of women, and the mistreatment of young, male Nigerians. In 2020, 
social media protests popularised the #EndSARS hashtag. This movement has been 
one of a kind, as it is the first time Nigerians of different classes, ethnic groups, and 
religions have united behind a shared cause. For a protest without leadership and 
amidst government suppression, it succeeded in systematically organising funds, 
welfare packages, lawyers, doctors, and ambulances at protest sites, including clean-
ing up after themselves at the end of each protest. Also, the protest moved beyond 
the shores of the country to Nigerians in the diaspora. The movement went global, 
with massive protests in other parts of Africa, the Caribbean, Canada, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. Nigerian celebrities in the diaspora and 
the Black Lives Matter movement have supported the cause. On 20 October 2020, 
armed soldiers shot at protesters; the number of casualties has not yet been ascer-
tained (Aljazeera 2020). The shootings may have halted physical protests, but not 
the movement. Protests will continue online and in more formalised formats.
EndSARS will proceed to become a more active social media movement, as pro-
testers continue to force concessions through various platforms. Social media has 
played a crucial role in the movement. By 9 October 2020, the hashtag had accu-
mulated 2.4 million tweets and was the number one trending topic on Twitter in 
several countries (Global Voices 2020). This attracted the global attention that the 
protest aimed for: having the International Criminal Court open an inquiry into the 
shootings (Samuel 2020). However, as expected from the Nigerian political elite, 
the movement will not proceed with online protests unsuppressed. There will be 
intensified calls for a social media bill as a means of clamping down. Besides, the re-
cent increase in COVID-19 infections will provide the government with a legitimate 
reason to ban any mass protests. Yet, protesters have begun working towards more 
formalised means of holding the Nigerian government accountable. Past events 
have motivated protesters to think and plan more seriously for upcoming elections. 
Town-hall meetings have been organised, and those at the forefront of the move-
ment have encouraged Nigerians to get their voter cards. 
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Dealing with the Pandemic’s Economic Fallout and Medium-
Term Risks
The economic impacts of the pandemic in Africa so far differ considerably from 
country to country; this also holds for the economic outlook. The direct economic 
effects of the pandemic vary due to differences in the length and intensity of lock-
down measures. Infection rates will have to be watched and new lockdown measures 
may come, but so far it seems that the indirect effects of the crisis will matter more 
than the direct ones for most countries. Again, these effects have varied and will 
vary considerably between countries, depending, inter alia, on their main exports 
(Lakemann, Lay, and Tafese 2020). In October, the International Monetary Fund 
forecast a moderate recovery for most countries of the region that would, however, 
typically not make up for the recessions of 2020. In light of the developments since 
then, these predictions may prove too optimistic, as many of the negative spillovers 
in particular from the EU and US will remain relevant for the first half of 2021. At 
the same time, positive signals come from commodity markets where prices for 
many African exports – from oil to cotton – have recovered to pre-pandemic levels. 
The current crisis entails important risks for the medium- and long-term eco-
nomic outlook. First, the crisis has reinforced a looming debt problem. Although 
fiscal responses have been much more limited in Africa than elsewhere in the world, 
government debt has risen across the continent – very considerably so in Ghana 
(from 63 per cent of gross domestic product in 2019 to 77 per cent thereof in 2020) 
and South Africa (62 per cent to 79 per cent), two regionally important economies. 
As fiscal consolidation cannot be a short-term remedy, debt sustainability will be an 
issue and requires continued international support, including for troubled middle-
income economies. The G20 debt service suspension initiative will probably need 
even further extension beyond the first half of 2021, but a more fundamental agree-
ment on debt restructuring will most likely not be achieved. 
Second, the economic downturn and the uncertainty induced by the pandemic 
has caused massive disinvestment by foreign firms and postponements and cancel-
lations of planned and new investment projects. Dwindling foreign direct invest-
ment inflows put Africa’s future integration into the world economy at risk, some-
thing which has been singled out by many African governments and multilateral 
and donor initiatives as key for structural transformation and the creation of jobs 
for the continent’s youth. Third, there is a risk that the pandemic stalls progress re-
garding projects of regional economic integration. Last year we suggested to watch 
“Implementing the Eco,” following a 2019 agreement of the heads of state of the 15 
members of the Economic Community of West African States to introduce a com-
mon currency. Nothing happened ultimately, and the plans were shelved for at least 
three years (if not longer). In contrast, the African Union recently reported some 
progress on the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) with “trading” 
supposed to start on 1 January 2021. Under the AfCFTA, AU member states – every-
one but Eritrea signed the agreement – must phase out 90 per cent of tariff lines 
over a period of five or 10 years, depending on their level of development. As of 
today, 37 of the zone’s 54 members states have ratified the agreement and 41 have 
submitted tariff-reduction schedules. Yet, effective implementation of the AfCFTA 
is likely to remain on our list of economic developments to be watched for a number 
of years to come.
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Looming Food Crises
Food shortages will remain a major concern in the region. Recent data from the 
World Bank’s High Frequency Phone Survey initiative suggests that across all 
countries surveyed, at least 45 per cent of households reported being worried about 
running out of food in the last 30 days. This illustrates the potentially destructive 
effects of the pandemic, but the situation is also exacerbated by an already-tense 
food-security situation in the conflict-ridden parts of the Sahel and the locust-in-
fected areas of East Africa. Continued infestations and adverse weather conditions 
will make food insecurity an issue in many African countries in 2021. By October 
2020, also Southern Africa – Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and parts 
of Angola – had been hit by the locust plague. Currently a second wave is hitting 
East Africa. In addition to the already-drastic harvest losses due to repeated locust 
infestations, the La Niña weather cycle with expected dry conditions and a poor 
rainy season in March to May 2021 bears the risk of bring devastating drought and 
hunger to East Africa, threatening the lives and livelihoods of millions of people in 
Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya in particular. 
The COVID-19 pandemic is not helping matters. Rather, it has once again ex-
posed the general vulnerability of many African countries to turbulences in global 
food markets. The current situation is special because it not only disrupts produc-
tion but also national and international supply chains. Disrupted supply chains 
push up prices. There are reports of sharply rising food prices – for example for 
some key staples in East and West Africa – that are likely to persist into 2021. 
Higher food prices coinciding with lower incomes poses a heavy burden for urban 
households. Yet, it should not go unnoticed that some global food supply chains 
have proven to be relatively resilient during the past year.
Africa–EU Relations: Catching Up on Urgent Issues at the Summit
In March 2020, the EU presented its “Comprehensive Strategy with Africa.” The 
new strategy builds on a growing momentum in EU–Africa relations that – at least 
on paper – emphasises a continent-to-continent partnership and was meant to pre-
pare the EU for the 2020 Africa–EU summit, which was eventually postponed to 
2021 because of the coronavirus outbreak. Progress in EU–Africa relations more or 
less stalled in 2020 as a result, but the summit – if it can take place – will be the key 
diplomatic event of this upcoming year.
It can build on an unexpected success: Late in 2020, the chief negotiators from 
the EU and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States reached a 
political deal for a new comprehensive Partnership Agreement that will succeed 
the Cotonou Agreement and will be signed in the second half of 2021. This post-
Cotonou agreement will cover a range of traditional areas of cooperation including 
political dialogue, trade, financial and technical cooperation, but also new areas 
such as the digital economy and cybersecurity. The new agreement’s main innova-
tion is the three regional protocols (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific): they will have their 
own specific governance, and focus on each region’s needs. In the African protocol, 
economic aspects dominate – with special emphasis on the role of (foreign) invest-
ment for growth and job creation.
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The Africa–EU summit will likely have to deal with the issue of access to and 
delivery of COVID-19 vaccines. On some economic topics, the summit can probably 
produce certain tangible results, including additional support for LICs and debt re-
duction/restructuring, and the post-pandemic recovery of European investments. 
The trade agenda may (again) not see much movement this year, as it: (a) is over-
shadowed by the pandemic; (b) is further complicated by uncertainties regarding 
regional integration and the AfCFTA; and, (c) builds on a model of agreements that 
appears to remain unacceptable to key economies. Note that, in principle, trade mat-
ters are meant to remain governed through Economic Partnership Agreements – also 
under the post-Cotonou agreement. This is despite the opportunities for reshaping 
the future of EU–Africa trade relations and intra-African trade provided by the pol-
itical progress made in recent years. 
The space for breakthroughs in 2021 is limited in other key policy arenas. With 
the United Kingdom leaving the EU, other countries need to step in to fill the ex-
pertise and the attention for Africa that left the Union. The EU and its member 
states will continue their support for creating peace and security, especially in the 
Sahel – where France and other EU members states have deployed troops, includ-
ing Germany within the framework of a United Nations mission. Although Europe’s 
efforts in the Sahel have proven largely unsuccessful (see Lierl 2020), no decisive 
turn for the better is likely to be seen in the cooperation with the G5 (Mauritania, 
Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad) in 2021 – although the EU’s new Counter-
terrorism Initiative does aim at greater strategic cooperation. This year is certain 
to see yet more of the dramatic examples of the EU’s failure to offer solutions to 
the migration crisis. Yet, EU member states remain caught between humanitarian 
challenges and the – often unspoken – hard interest to contain migration flows. 
Pandemic-induced economic hardship and conflicts throughout the region will in-
crease the motivation to emigrate. 
Africa–US relations: The End of “Apathy” after Trump?
The new US president Joe Biden will drastically change the tone of American for-
eign policy towards Africa. While his predecessor Trump infamously referred to Af-
rican nations as “shithole countries,” rigorously pursued his “America First” policy, 
and introduced a “Muslim travel ban” that also denied entry to individuals from 
African countries with a Muslim majority, Biden has promised the restoration of 
“mutually respectful engagement” with the continent. Biden’s new foreign policy 
team and in particular his designated secretary of state, Antony Blinken, prom-
ise a more professional, consistent, and effective approach to foreign policy and a 
stronger diplomatic footprint in Africa in the years to come. 
However, rhetoric will change more dramatically than actual policy. Since the 
Bill Clinton era, Democrats and Republicans have strongly converged in their views 
on US Africa policy. Even President Barack Obama, whose election as the first black 
US president was hailed in Africa, largely neglected the continent. Obama’s much-
touted “Pivot to Africa” set the tone not only for his but also for – admittedly in a 
very different fashion – the Trump presidency. The obsession of foreign policymak-
ers in Washington with the geostrategic competition with China will most likely 
also be the prism with which they look at Africa. This may create an impetus for 
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more substantive US engagement in Africa under President Biden so as to balance 
China’s broad spectrum of activities and its growing influence there. 
The biggest issue might be reviving trade relations with the continent and step-
ping up engagement with African countries on global and UN affairs – they consti-
tute more than one-quarter of all UN members. Yet in other policy fields, Biden’s 
administration will most probably show more continuity. For one, US bilateral se-
curity and development assistance to Africa has hovered at around the USD 7 bil-
lion per year mark in recent years; some 70–75 per cent of these funds are dedicated 
to address health challenges like HIV/AIDS and malaria. It is doubtful whether 
the Biden administration will massively increase these funds amidst the current 
pandemic’s economic fallout. Second, security will remain a major concern. Ameri-
can counterterrorism efforts will probably remain in place or might even grow to 
fight intensifying Islamist extremism in, for instance, the Sahel, Nigeria, Mozam-
bique, and East Africa. Finally, Presidents George W. Bush, Obama, and Trump 
all launched their signature Africa initiatives, including the latter’s “Power Africa” 
scheme. It would be a surprise if President Biden did not follow this precedent and 
start his own signature Africa initiative then. 
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